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SCHLESINGER APPEAL: UNION OF FUNCTIONS OF
PROSECUTOR AND JUDGE CONDEMNED
In Schlesinger Appeal' the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania reversed an
order of disbarment which had been entered by the Court of Common Pleas
of Allegheny County. The supreme court held that Schlesinger had been
denied due process because the functions of prosecutor and judge had both
been vested in the Committee on Offenses of the county court. The purpose
of this Note is to analyze the basis for the supreme court's holding and to
point out the possible effect of this decision on long-standing administrative
practices.
In May, 1950, Schlesinger had been charged with "professional misconduct" by the Committee on Offenses of the Allegheny Court of Common
Pleas. In September, 1950, a subcommittee of three was appointed by the
Committee to hear argument on Schlesinger's motion to dismiss the complaint.
The motion to dismiss was denied by the Committee upon recommendation
of the subcommittee. After hearings during 1954 and 1955, and argument
in 1956, the subcommittee filed its report finding that Schlesinger had been
guilty of professional misconduct "in that he has violated the oath adminisfered to him at the time of his admission to the bar."'2 This conclusion was
based on the finding that Schlesinger was a member and functionary of the
Communist Party. The subcommittee's recommendation that Schlesinger be
disbarred was adopted by the Committee and filed in the court of common
pleas. Exceptions to the report and recommendation were then argued before
three judges of that court. Two years later, an opinion was filed by the
court dismissing Schlesinger's exceptions and recommending to the Board
of Judges of the Court of Common Pleas that Schlesinger be disbarred, which
recommendation was adopted by the Board. Schlesinger's appeal to the
supreme court followed.
One of the bases for the reversal by the supreme court of the order
of disbarment was that the appellant had been deprived of due process because
the functions of prosecutor, judge and jury had been vested in the Committee on Offenses, and that "this fundamentally fatal procedural defect
1. 404 Pa. 584, 172 A.2d 835 (1961).
2. Id. at 591, 172 A.2d at 837.
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deprived the appellant of the fair hearing to which due process of law
entitled him." 3
The facts of the case forcefully support the supreme court's conclusion.
The Committee on Offenses lodged and prosecuted the disbarment proceeding. The hearings were held before their own subcommittee. All witnesses
were heard by this subcommittee. Since the Committee and ultimately the
Board of Judges adopted the conclusion of the subcommittee that, as a matter
of law, the appellant "has been guilty of professional misconduct," without
hearing any of the witnesses, it is a fair conclusion that the Committee on
Offenses (through its subcommittee) also adjudicated the matter.
Justice Bell, in his dissenting opinion, treats the union of prosecutor,
judge and jury, as "relatively minor,' 4 stating:
The majority also take the position that Schlesinger was deprived
of a fair trial and consequently of due process because the Committee
on Offenses presented the cases against him and acted as both Judge
and jury, subject, of course, to an appeal to the Court of Common
Pleas. There is no merit in this contention.,
Justice Bell then made an argument in favor of blue ribbon juries, 6 stating
that this jury would be inclined toward giving Schlesinger the benefit of any
doubt. He then continued:
Furthermore, and even more important, The Pennsylvania Labor
Relations Board, and the Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board act
exactly the way that the Committee on Offenses did in the instant.
case. They frequently investigate a possible violator and then bring
a prosecution against him and then act as prosecutor, Judge and
jury. Such a proceeding or procedure has been impliedly approved
by this Court about 100 times. Furthermore, Blenko v. Schmeltz,
362 Pa. 365, 67 A.2d 99, which is relied upon by the majority, is
not only so different on its facts as to be clearly distinguishable,
but even that case recognized that in certain situations it would be
proper and necessary for a Committee or Board to act as prosecutor
and trial tribunal at the same time .... 7
In Blenko v. Schmeltz,8 referred to in the above-quoted passage, a
member of the bar sued in equity to restrain the Board of Managers of the
Patent Law Association of Pittsburgh from expelling him from their organiza3. Id. at 600, 172 A.2d at 842. An alternative ground for the decision was that
"the testimony of the Committee's witnesses, which the Subcommittee, as trial tribunal,
accepted and presumably accredited, was insufficient, as a matter of law, to convict the
appellant of professional misconduct." Id. at 601, 172 A.2d at 842.
4. Id. at 624, 172 A.2d at 853.
5. Id. at 625-26, 172 A.2d at 854.
6. Id. at 626, 172 A.2d at 854.
7. Id. at 626-27, 172 A.2d at 855.
8. 362 Pa. 365, 67 A.2d 99 (1949).
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tion. It was held that the defendants should be so restrained because they
had prejudged his conduct, had borne personal animosities and prejudices
against him, and therefore could not have accorded him a fair and impartial
hearing. Blenko can be distinguished from Schlesinger on the basis that
Blenko had been requested to resign before the hearing and prejudice was
therefore apparent. However, the court in Blenko stated:
It appears clear to us that defendant board, in violation of elementary
principles, was acting as prosecutor and trial tribunal at the same
time. When both functions, in rare cases of necessity, become united
in a single person or tribunal, it is not only necessary that there be
absolute impartiality but it is necessary that such impartiality appear
without possibility of misunderstanding. The record now discloses
complete disqualification. 9
It is submitted that the Schlesinger proceeding was not one in which
there was a necessity for uniting the functions of prosecutor, judge and jury.
It can be envisioned that, in certain situations, only the prosecuting body
would have the expertise necessary properly to decide the case. In the
Schlesinger case, however, there does not seem to be any reason why the
Committee on Offenses should not have been required to prosecute the
action before a court.
The disturbing feature of the Schlesinger case is that Justice Bell's
statement that administrative proceedings in which the functions of prosecutor and judge have been united have "been impliedly approved by this
court about 100 times"' 0 now seems open to some doubt. Justice Bell makes
no reference to any cases supporting his thesis, though doubtless they exist,
but, so far as can be ascertained, the approval of such action exists only to
the extent that no one has seen fit to challenge it in this Commonwealth.
The Supreme Court of the United States, in Tumey v. Ohio," held that
the best way to avoid the prejudice inherent in such procedure is to refuse
to permit the union of prosecutor and judge. In that case, the defendant,
who had been accused of violating a liquor law, was tried before the mayor,
whose sole source of fees in such cases was the fine imposed. The Court there
held that "a situation in which an official perforce occupies two practically
and seriously inconsistent positions, one partisan and the other judicial,
necessarily involves a lack of due process of law in the trial of defendants
2
charged with crimes before him."'
The Tumey case is factually distinguishable from Schlesinger on several
bases. In Tumey the mayor had a definite pecuniary interest in the result,
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. at 374, 67 A.2d at 103.
Schlesinger Appeal, supra note 1, at 626, 172 A.2d at 855.
273 U.S. 510 (1927).
Id. at 534.
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whereas, in Schlesinger, the pecuniary interests of the members of the Committee on Offenses were, at best, quite remote. However, the Supreme Court
in Tumey states quite generally that officers acting in a judicial or quasijudicial capacity are disqualified by their interest in the controversy to be
decided. It seems evident that a body which is prosecuting a man in a disbarment proceeding would be more than nominally interested in obtaining an
order in their favor. It can also be argued that while Tumey involved a
criminal proceeding, the disbarment proceeding in Schlesinger was not criminal. However, the obvious importance to an attorney of his right to practice
his profession dictates that all constitutional safeguards be observed.' 3
The general undesirability of uniting the functions of prosecutor and
judge has long been recognized. In Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath,14 a case
involving the deportation of an alien, the Supreme Court was faced with the
problem of whether the deportation had to comply with the Administrative
Procedure Act, 15 and, if so, whether there had been compliance. The Court,
after noting that one purpose of the act was to provide uniformity of practice and procedure among the various agencies, then stated:
More fundamental, however, was the purpose to curtail and
change the practice of embodying in one person or agency the duties
of prosecutor and judge. The President's Committee on Administrative Management voiced in 1937 the theme which, with variations
in language, was reiterated throughout the legislative history of the
Act. The Committee's report, which President Roosevelt transmitted to Congress with his approval as "a great document of
permanent importance," said: ".

.

. the independent commission is

obliged to carry on judicial functions under conditions which threaten
the impartial performance of that judicial work ...
"Furthermore, the same men are obliged to serve both as
prosecutors and as judges. This not only undermines judicial fairness; it weakens public confidence in that fairness. Commission
decisions affecting private rights and conduct lie under the suspicion of being rationalizations of the preliminary findings which the
16
commission, in the role of prosecutor, presented to itself."'
Despite the Supreme Court's reference to the union of prosecutor and judge
as "one of the several administrative evils sought to be cured or minimized,"' 7
13. Schware v. Board of Bar Examiners, 353 U.S. 232 (1957) ; Ex parte Garland,
71 U.S. 333 (1886) ; Schlesinger Petition, 367 Pa. 476, 81 A.2d 316 (1951) (The right
to practice law "may neither be extinguished, abated nor dismissed by any proceeding
short of one which fully comports with the historical and constitutional requisites of
due process.").
14. 339 U.S. 33 (1950).
15. 60 Stat. 237-44 (1946), 5 U.S.C. §§ 1001-11 (1958).
16. Wong Yang Sung v.McGrath,supra note 14, at 41-42.
17. Id. at 41.

1962]

RECENT CASE

the McGrath case itself in no way implies that such union is unconstitutional.
That question was not directly before the Court because it was held that the
Administrative Procedure Act controlled.
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court appears to have taken a strong stand
on this question, however, in Schlesinger, where they quoted the following
language of the United States Supreme Court in In Re Murchison:'8
A fair trial in a fair tribunal is a basic requirement of due
process. Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the
trial of cases. But our system of law has always endeavored to
prevent even the probability of unfairness. To this end no man can
be a judge in his own case and no man is permitted to try cases
where he has an interest in the outcome. . . This Court has
said . . . that "every procedure which would offer a possible

temptation to the average man as a judge . . .not to hold the
balance nice, clear and true between the State and the accused, denies
the latter due process of law." Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532.19
In the Murchison case it was held that for the same judge to cite defendants
for contempt and then try them for contempt did not comport with due
process. The position of the Court can perhaps best be found in its statements that a disqualifying interest "cannot be defined with precision" and
that the "circumstances and relationships must be considered." This general
rule would appear to have been given some content, however, by the Court's
declaration that "our system of law has always endeavored to prevent even
the probability of unfairness." A broad prohibition of the union of the functions of prosecutor and judge would thus seem to have been advocated, for
it would appear that only by such precaution could the "probability of unfairness" be prevented.
It may not be insignificant to note here that important langauge of these
decisions has undergone an evolution. Tumey indicates that the evil to be
avoided is the "possible temptation" to be impartial. The Murchison court,
though quoting Tumey with approval, nevertheless seems to dilute that language by rephrasing it into "the probability of unfairness." The court in
Schlesinger, perhaps unconsciously, chose to revert to the stricter "possible
temptation" language of Tumey, as is quite apparent in the following excerpt
from their opinion:
Here, a member of the bar, charged with unprofessional conduct
by a bar Committee on Offenses, was prosecuted on the Committee's
complaint before a Subcommittee, composed of three members of
the Committee, sitting as the trial tribunal. In such a proceeding,
so contrary to traditional American juridical concepts, unfairness
18. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
19. Id. at 136.
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was, ipso facto, inherent; it was fraught with the possibility of
temptation to each member of the trial tribunal to favor, consciously
or unconsciously, the prosecuting body which appointed him and of
which he was a member. The record as a whole contains a reasonable basis for doubt as to whether impartiality on the part of the
members of the tribunal was completely absent and suggests an
unsympathetic predisposition toward the appellant. Moreover, a
predilection to favor one side over the other is not required in order
to vitiate a judicial proceeding as being violative of due process.
Merely, "a possible temptation to the average man as a judge . . .
not to hold the balance, nice, clear and true" is sufficient. Such
"a possible temptation" was implicit in the proceeding before the
prosecutor's own Subcommittee which resulted in appellant's dis20
barment.
Whether or not the Pennsylvania Supreme Court purposely chose the stricter
language of Tumey in order to lay a foundation for reform in this area
cannot be divined. It would seem that the court could have found, on the
facts of the Schlesinger case, a "probability of unfairness" instead of adverting to the Tumey rule. In any event, the court has, by this broad language,
paved the way for a bold and progressive step in the field of administrative
law, namely, the condemnation of the prevailing administrative agency
practice of unifying the functions of prosecutor and judge.
LEE A. LEVINE
20. Supra note 1, at 598, 172 A.2d at 841.

